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Chris-Craft and the more restrictive posture that the Supreme Court gen-
erally has adopted toward private actions under the federal securities laws.
William R. Goodell
VI. COMMON LAW DERIVATIVE RECOVERY OF
INSIDER PROFITS
Whether a corporate insider may be held accountable to the corpora-
tion for profits realized through trading in the corporate stock on the basis
of undisclosed material information is a question that neither common law
doctrine nor the existing federal statutory scheme has answered ade-
quately. Under common law, insider trading' traditionally imposed no
fiduciary duties on a corporate insider with respect to the corporation2
since the fiduciary obligations extended only to corporate affairs.3 A trans-
action in corporate stock was deemed to be a private transaction rather
than a corporate function. Thus, an insider could purchase or sell stock of
his or her corporation as a private individual, free of any extrinsic obliga-
tions to the corporation.
Supplementing the unrestrictive common law doctrine with respect to
insider trading obligations is section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ('34 Act) .4 Section 10b makes unlawful the use or employment of
any manipulative or deceptive device in violation of Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC)' regulations in connection with the sale or purchase of
I Insider trading is a term of art connoting the purchase or sale of corporate stock by
persons who, because of their relationship to the corporation, are privy to nonpublic material
information. Anyone in possession of material inside information may be considered an insi-
der under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). See,
e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
2 Although insider traders owed no common law fiduciary duty to the corporation, there
is a conflict of opinion with regard to the common law duties owed by an insider to sharehold-
ers from whom securities are purchased or to whom securities are sold without disclosure of
information which affects the value of the shares. See 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
CORPORATIONS §§ 1167-74 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]; H. Henn, Law of
Corporations § 239 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN); 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrIEs
REGULATION 1446-48 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. Under the majority rule, no
fiduciary or affirmative duties of disclosure arise in a stock transaction between an insider
and an outside shareholder. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir. 1965).
Under the minority rule, a fiduciary duty is owed to outside stockholders and full disclosure
of all material facts is required prior to purchase or sale of corporate stock by an insider. See,
e.g., Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 321-27 (5th Cir. 1959). A
third, less widely recognized rule only imposes a fiduciary duty of disclosure under special
facts or exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 434 (1909).
1 Directors and officers of a corporation are under pervasive duties of loyalty and alle-
giance to their corporation. These fiduciary duties require good faith and fair dealing in all
corporate endeavors. See generally HENN, supra note 2, at §§ 235-38.
A 15 U S.C. § 78j (1976). See generally Loss, supra note 2, at 1448-73.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is a quasijudicial federal agency
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any security. The SEC regulation which effectuates section 10b is Rule
10b-5.1 Rule 10b-5 explicitly proscribes any act or practice which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit in connection with a securities trans-
action. Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 thus act as comprehensive antifraud
provisions,7 and have been extended judicially to encompass nondisclosure
of material information,8 as well as affirmative misrepresentations' when
an insider trades in the stock of his or her corporation. Rule 10b-5 has
expanded the duty which an insider owes to shareholders from whom se-
curities are purchased."0 The cause of action for breach of Rule 10b-5 duties
is limited, however, in that standing to sue in a private action brought
under Rule 10b-5 is restricted by a purchaser-seller requirement." The
purchaser-seller requirement mandates that only actual purchasers or sell-
ers of the involved securities may maintain a private damage action under
Rule 10b-5. Insofar as a corporation generally will not meet the purchaser-
seller requirement," a Rule 10b-5 action normally will not be a viable
means to effect corporate re6overy of insider profits, either directly or
through a shareholder derivative action."
Corporate recovery of profits realized through insider trading may be
which was established by the '34 Act for the purpose of administering federal securities laws.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78d to d-2 (1976). The SEC is composed of five bipartisan -commissioners
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve five year terms.
Id. § 78d.
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). See generally FLETCHER, supra note 2, at § 900.3.
Rule 10b-5 has been judicially construed to provide for a private cause of action to
recover damages. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 789, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947). In addition, in a 10b-5 action,
the common law requirements of scienter, deception, reliance and privity are generally re-
laxed. See HENN, supra note 2, at 298; 6 Loss, supra note 2, at 3869-96; Comment, Damages
to Uninformed Traders For Insider Trading on Impersonal Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 299,
302-305 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Uninformed Traders].
' See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 & 854 (2d Cir. 1968).
' See Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830
(1974).
,0 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
i See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Blue Chip reaf-
firmed the rule set forth in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co., .193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), which held that standing to sue in a private 10b-5 action is
dependent upon fraud perpetrated in connection with the actual purchase or sale of a secu-
rity. See generally 1976-1977 Securities Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 34 WASH. & LEE L.
Ray. 882, 882-87 (1977).
1, See, e.g., Norsul Oil and Mining, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 1242, 1245
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Generally, corporations will not meet the purchaser-seller requirement when
an insider trades in the corporate stock since the sale or purchase of stock will involve an
anonymous extra-corporate third party rather than the corporation. But see Brophy v. Cities
Serv. Co., 31 Del Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (insider trading based on knowledge of corpora-
tion's plan to purchase 6wn stock; corporation could have met purchaser-seller requirement
by virtue of purchase).
11 A shareholder derivative action, as developed in equity, allows a corporate stockholder
to enforce a right of the corporation where the corporation has refused to sue on its own behalf.
See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; HENN, supra note 2, at §§ 358-76.
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allowed, however, under section 16(b) of the '34 Act.'4 Section 16(b) gives
the issuer of a security a cause of action to recover any profits realized by
a corporate officer, director, or beneficial owner in connection with the sale
and purchase or purchase and sale of the securities of the issuer within a
six month period. 5 If the issuer of a security fails or refuses to bring suit
under section 16(b) within sixty days after a request to initiate suit is made
by an owner of the issuer's securities, a shareholder derivative action may
be brought. 8 The purpose of section 16(b) is to protect outside shareholders
from the manipulative practices which result from insider trading on un-
disclosed inside information, 7 and to provide all persons trading in the
stock market with equal access to material information." By allowing cor-
porate recapture of profits gained through shortswing transactions which
occur within a six month period, section 16(b) acts as a deterrent to certain
insider trading."
The deterrent effect of section 16(b) is limited, however, insofar as only
officers, directors, or beneficial owners are subject to the regulatory provi-
sions." In addition, section 16(b) only regulates trading that occurs within
a six month period. Thus, an insider who holds stock for at least six months
prior to resale is not subject to 16(b) liability regardless of whether the
transaction involved the use of undisclosed material information. 2' As a
result of these pervasive limitations on its scope, section 16(b) cannot fully
provide for corporate recovery of all insider trading profits. These short-
comings in the existing federal statutory scheme illustrate the inadequacy
of presently available federal remedies 2 and suggest the need for develop-
'" 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976); see HENN, supra note 2, at § 298; 2 Loss, supra note 2, at 1040-
89. Section 16(a) of the '34 Act requires that any director, officer, or 10% beneficial owner of
a corporation must file initial reports with the SEC disclosing the amount of all equity
securities of the corporation which the insider owns. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976). Subsequent
reports must be filed promptly upon any change in the ownership of such securities. Id.
,5 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976); see text accompanying notes 16-19 infra.
" See note 13 supra. Derivative actions brought under § 16(b) are subject to a two-year
statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), and must be brought in federal court. 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
,7 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943). Section 16(b) recovery is based on the notion that confidential nonpublic information
is essentially corporate property. See Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under The Securities
Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 408 (1953). Contra, H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET (1966) (defense of insider trading as a positive market force).
"8 See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
," While failing to cover transactions which do not occur within a six month period, §
16(b) presumes the use of inside information in any shortswing transactions and imposes
liability per se regardless of whether the transactions involved were predicated on inside
information and regardless of the insider's good faith.
0 Section 16(b) will not deter trading by people such as "tipees," who are not officers,
directors, or beneficial owners of the corporation. "Tipees" are extra-corporate persons to
whom confidential inside information is disclosed.
21 See, e.g., Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 85-86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827
(1954).
2 Sections 10b and 16(b) of the '34 Act are presently the primary federal remedies for
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ment of an alternative cause of action.
In Diamond v. Oreamuno,2' the New York Court of Appeals attempted
to create such an alternative remedy. The plaintiff-shareholder in
Diamond brought suit in state court asserting a derivative action against
officers and directors of Management Assistance, Inc. (MAI).2 4 Due to a
sharp increase in the cost of services in August 1966, MAI's monthly net
earnings declined approximately seventy-five percent.2 Prior to public dis-
closure of MAI's decreased earnings, the chairman and president of MAI
sold substantial personal holdings of MAI stock with knowledge of the
corporation's markedly decreased earningsY.2 Through their timely sales of
stock, the defendants allegedly were able to realize substantially more for
their securities than they would have had they not been privy to the inside
information regarding MAI's earnings outlook.2 1 Plaintiff-shareholder
sought to have the defendants account to the corporation for the "profit"
realized on the sales of their stock prior to public disclosure of the inside
information, which when disclosed effected a substantial drop in the mar-
ket value of MAI stock.y
In upholding the sufficiency of the Diamond complaint, the New York
Court of Appeals recognized the inapplicability of federal remedies .2 Al-
ternatively, the court relied on common law principles of agency and trus-
teeship to define a fiduciary duty between a corporate insider and his or
recovery of insider trading profits. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j & p (1976). Class action suits, however,
may provide a third possible federal remedy. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See generally Bernfeld,
Class Actions and Federal Securities Law, 55 CoRNELL L.Q. 78, 78-94 (1969); Note, Class
Action Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule 23, 36 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1150, 1150-68 (1968). In Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), the court explicitly acknowledged that federal class actions might become
an effective alternative to existing remedies. Id. at 502, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at
84. The mechanics of such an action, however, remain unresolved. Thus class actions pres-
ently are an uncertain vehicle to effect derivative recovery of insider trading profits. Difficul-
ties involved in litigating a class action suit to recover insider profits would include procurring
certification under FED. R. Civ. P. 23, properly defining the plaintiff class, providing requisite
notification to members of the class, determining the measure of damages, and administering
the distribution of the recovered profits. See Note, Class Action Treatment of Securities
Fraud Suits Under The Revised Rule 23, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1150, 1153-66 (1968).
- 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). Diamond was the first state
case to allow stockholder derivative recovery of insider profits derived by corporate officers
or directors from trading in the corporate stock. See generally 9 GA. L. REv. 189 (1974); 83
HARv. L. REv. 1421 (1970); 1970 Wis. L. REv. 576; 55 VA. L. Rav. 1520 (1969).
24 24 N.Y.2d at 496-97, 248 N.E.2d at 911, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 79-80.
2 Id.
25 Id.
2 Id. The defendants sold their stock for $28 per share. Following public disclosure of
MAI's drop in earnings, the value of MAI stock fell to $11 per share. Id.
2 Id.; see note 27 supra. The plaintiff-shareholder alleged that the defendants had
breached a fiduciary duty to the corporation by trading on the basis of undisclosed material
information, thus giving rise to a common law cause of action. 24 N.Y.2d at 496, 248 N.E.2d
at 911, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
21 24 N.Y.2d at 500-03, 248 N.E.2d at 913-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 82-85 (federal remedies
inapplicable because statutory requirements not met). "
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her corporation with respect to the exploitation of inside information for
personal benefit." Two primary elements served to establish this duty.
First, the court impliedly held that inside information was the functional
equivalent of a corporate asset to which fiduciary duties could attach.3
Traditionally, inside information has not been considered a corporate asset
unless the information was of such a nature as to provide the corporation
with a "corporate opportunity. '32 The Diamond court, however, did not
address the issue of fiduciary duty in terms of lost corporate opportunity.
Rather, Diamond relied on the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which
emphasizes the means by which confidential information is acquired and
strictly imposes liability for misuse if the information was acquired in the
course of an agent's employment.? Thus, Diamond impliedly held that
corporate information acquired by virtue of a confidential employment
relationship is tantamount to a corporate asset to which fiduciary responsi-
bility is owed. 4
Second, the Diamond court held that actual damage to the corporation
is not an essential element for a cause of action founded on a breach of duty
1 The Diamond court relied upon Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5
(1949). In Brophy, an employee who was not an officer or director of Cities Services Co., had
knowledge of a Cities Services plan to purchase significant quantities of its own stock on the
open market. With this knowledge, the employee bought stock for his personal account prior
to the Cities Services' purchase. Subsequently, the employee sold the stock after the com-
pany's purchase resulted in an increase in the market price of the securities. A stockholder
derivative suit was brought to effect common law recovery of all profits realized from the
employee's purchase and sale of this stock. Id. at 7. The Brophy case may possibly be
distinguished from Diamond in that actual pecuniary harm could have occurred to the corpo-
ration in Brophy. The employee's purchase of stock conceivably caused Cities Services to
purchase its stock at a higher price. The Brophy court, however, did not require actual loss
to the corporation to be pleaded or proved in the derivative action. Id. at 8. See generally 63
HARV. L. REV. 1446, 1446-48 (1950).
31 24 N.Y.2d at 497-98, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80. If inside information is
considered a corporate asset, the use of that information in insider trading by an officer or
director would be tantamount to misappropriation or conversion. Virtually no controversy
exists over the liability imposed on corporate officers or directors for such unauthorized use
of corporate assets. See FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 1102.
32 Under the corporate opportunity doctrine, an officer or director is under a fiduciary
duty not to appropriate, for their own benefit, opportunities in which the corporation has a
right, interest, or expectancy. See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.
1934). See generally HENN, supra note 2, § 237.
24 N.Y.2d at 501, 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 83. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF AGENCY § 388, Comment c (1958) states in relevant part:
An agent who acquires confidential information in the course of his employment or
in violation of his duties has a duty . . . to account for any profits made by the
use of such information, although this does not harm the principal. . . .So, if he
[a corporate officer] has "inside" information that the corporation is about to
purchase or sell securities, or to declare or to pass a dividend, profits made by him
in stock transactions undertaken because of his knowledge are held in constructive
trust for the principal.
" The actual pecuniary value of inside information to the corporation in a Diamond-type
situation is uncertain.
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by a corporate fiduciary.35 Absent a requirement of actual damage, the
court reasoned that corporate officers or directors, as fiduciaries with re-
spect to corporate assets, should not be allowed to retain profits derived
solely from exploitation or violation of their fiduciary obligations. 6 The
Diamond court realized that existing federal legislation would not apply
to all cases of trading on inside information, 37 and thus sought to remedy
the unregulated abuse of inside information by creating a common law
cause of action premised on notions of fiduciary responsibility.38
Other states, however, have not followid New York's innovative con-
cept and have refused to create a state remedy allowing derivative recovery
of insider profits regardless of whether actual harm occurred to the corpo-
ration. In Schein v. Chasen,31 the Florida Supreme Court explicitly refused
to adopt the Diamond rationale to allow derivative recovery of profits
realized by non-insiders who trade in the corporation's stock on the basis
35 24 N.Y.2d at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81. Harm to the corporation was
not deemed essential because the function of an action founded on breach of a fiduciary duty
is not merely compensation but deterrence. Id. The New York Court of Appeals viewed a
remedy based on breach of fiduciary responsibility as an essentially preventative measure.
By removing the inducement to use inside information to trade in the corporate stock, the
Diamond court sought not merely to compensate for, but to prevent such abuse. Id.
u In actions based on conversions or misappropriations of corporate assets, actual harm
to the corporation generally is irrelevant. See, e.g., Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 256 F.2d
504 (3d Cir. 1958); Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934). See also FLETCHER,
supra note 2, § 1102. The Diamond court intimated, however, that insider realization of
profits based on undisclosed information could, in effect, cause harm to the corporation by
adversely affecting the marketability of the corporate stock by undermining public regard for
the corporation once the public becomes aware of the insider dealings. 24 N.Y.2d at 499-500,
248 N.E.2d at 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82. The prestige and good will of a corporation may
inevitably suffer as a result of the appearance of corporate diihonesty conveyed through
insider trading.
N See text accompanying notes 4-22 supra.
31 24 N.Y.2d at 497-504, 248 N.E.2d at 912-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80-86.
31 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975). In Schein, corporate shareholders of Lum's, Inc., a Florida
corporation, initially brought a derivative suit in a New York federal district court to recover
profits realized by numerous defendants through trading on the basis of inside information.
The district court held Florida law to be applicable and granted summary judgment to the
defendants from which the plaintiffs appealed. Gildenhorn v. Lum's, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that the substantive law of Florida
should govern the case. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 1973). Since there was
no clearly enunciated state law, the Second Circuit looked primarily to New York law as set
forth in Diamond and sought to discern how the Florida court would interpret the Diamond
decision. Id. The court, in reversing the district court's decision, held that the Diamond
holding should be extended to reach third parties who knowingly join or participate in an
enterprise whereby a violation of a fiduciary duty to the corporation occurs. 478 F.2d at 822.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Second Circuit's opinion was vacated
and remanded. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 368 (1974). The Supreme Court directed
that the question be certified to the Florida Supleme Court as is provided for under Florida
law. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1973). Thd Court emphasized that certification was
particularly appropriate in light of the novelty of the issue presented, the lack of Florida
precedents, and the questionable ability of a New York court to predict accurately uncertain
Florida law. 416 U.S. at 391.
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of inside information received from an insider prior to public disclosure.
In Schein, a corporate president privately informed certain outsiders that
his corporation's earnings would be significantly lower than had been pub-
licly predicted." On the basis of this information, and prior to public
disclosure, the outsiders sold their holdings of the corporation's stock,
anticipating the significant decrease in the market value of the stock which
occurred upon public disclosure of the company's actual earnings.', The
Florida Supreme Court rejected Diamond and refused to hold third party
extra-corporate defendants to the same risk of liability as insiders who
trade on the basis of undisclosed inside information.2 In so holding, the
Florida court declined to extend the fiduciary duty imposed on corporate
officers and directors to those who become functional fiduciaries through
the acquisition of confidential information belonging to the corporation.7
The Florida Supreme Court adopted the reasoning that the central ele-
ment of third party fiduciary liability must be the third party's active and
intentional encouragement and participation in an agent's violation of a
fiduciary duty owed to the corporate principal.4 Absent such active in-
volvement by a extra-corporate third party in the breach of a fiduciary
duty, the Schein court determined that the Diamond rationale for liability
ceases to exist,4" and thus refused either to adopt or expand the innovative
Diamond ruling.
Recently, in Freeman v. Decio,47 the Seventh Circuit similarly rejected
Diamond by holding that Indiana law would not recognize a Diamond-type
cause of action. In Freeman, the plaintiff-shareholder initiated a derivative
suit in federal court alleging that the defendant corporate directors sold
313 So. 2d at 741.
Id.
Id. at 746-47.
The Second Circuit had previously adopted the position that fiduciary responsibility
should extend beyond corporate employees. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 823 (2d Cir.
1973). The Second Circuit relied upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 which
defines third party liability as arising when one causes or assists an agent to violate his
fiduciary duty, and Comment c to § 312 which indicates that one who receives confidential
information with notice that an agent is violating a duty by disclosing such information, in
effect, becomes a fiduciary with respect to that information. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 312, Comment c (1958).
" 313 So. 2d at 745.
4' Id. The Florida Supreme Court adopted the reasoning set forth in Judge Irving Kauf-
man's dissent from the Second Circuit's opinion in Schein v. Chasen. Id. at 743-46. Kaufman
distinguished Diamond as pertaining only to officers and directors, who by virtue of their
position are in a fiduciary relationship to the corproation. 478 F.2d at 826-27. Absent a
fiduciary relationship, Kaufman found the Diamond rationale for imposition of liability to
be inapposite. Id. Judge Kaufman disagreed with the majority reasoning of the Second
Circuit that a joint or common enterprise with a corporate officer existed, and thus, found
no basis for extension of the Diamond rationale. Id. at 825-28.
,1 313 So. 2d at 746. The Florida court also stipulated that actual damage to the corpora-
tion must be alleged and proved to substantiate a stockholder derivative action. Id. at 746-
47.
47 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978).
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and transferred personal holdings of the corporation's stock on the basis
of material nonpublic information." Given the lack of Indiana precedent,
the Seventh Circuit was required to determine whether the Indiana courts
would be more likely to follow the New York Court of Appeal's holding in
Diamond or the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Schein." Reviewing
the Diamond decision, the Seventh Circuit recognized the public policy
considerations on which Diamond is based, and acknowledged that the
discouragement of insider trading is widely accepted from a policy point
of view. 0 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit questioned the propriety of the
Diamond court's ruling and refused to accept the Diamond rationale51
The Freeman decision rests primarily on the Seventh Circuit's rejection
of the premise, set forth in Diamond, that inside information is the equiva-
lent of a corporate asset to which fiduciary responsibility will attach. Ac-
ceptance of this premise removes the need to prove actual injury to the
corporation.5" The Freeman court, however, rejected the premise and de-
termined that there is no injury to the corporation in a Diamond-type suit
which can serve as a basis for recognizing a right of recovery in favor of
the corporation. 3 The Seventh Circuit suggested that considering inside
information as a corproate asset presupposes an answer to the inquiry, and
that "[i]t might be better to ask whether there is any potential loss to the
corporation from the use of such information in insider trading before
11 Id. at 187. Freeman sought to recover derivatively under Indiana law the profits real-
ized through the defendant's trading in the corporate stock. The complaint alleged that the
defendant-directors sold and transferred personal stock prior to public announcement of
significantly reduced corporate earnings. The complaint sought recovery on the grounds that
Indiana law should provide for a derivative cause of action to recover insider profits, and that
alternatively, two of the defendant directors had violated § 16(b) of the '34 Act. The district
court, in an unreported opinion, held that Indiana law did not provide for such a derivative
cause of action and that the plaintiff had not succedded in creating a genuine dispute as to
whether material inside information was the basis of the defendant's transactions. The dis-
trict court also dismissed the § 16(b) claim against one of the defendant directors, holding
that the securities in question were not purchased within a six-month period of their sale as
defined by § 16(b). The court did not rule on the § 16(b) claim against a second director and
the Seventh Circuit subsequently determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim. 584
F.2d at 188, 188 n.2.
" Id. at 189.
Id. The Freeman court discussed the economically based argument that prohibiting
insider trading impedes the efficiency of the securities market with respect to capital alloca-
tion. Id. at 190. See generally H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). The
Seventh Circuit, however, admitted that most authorities favor the discouragement of insider
trading when confronted with the necessity of balancing economic efficiency with fairness in
the marketplace. 584 F.2d at 190. Even Judge Kaufman, in his dissent from the Second
Circuit's Schein opinion, see note 45 supra, conceded that trading on inside information
merits universal condemnation. 478 F.2d at 825.
11 584 F.2d at 191-96. The Seventh Circuit determined that the Indiana courts most likely
would refuse to adopt Diamond and alternatively would elect to follow the logic of Schein.
Id. at 196.
52 See text accompanying notes 29-36 supra.
0 584 F.2d at 192.
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deciding to characterize the inside information as an asset with respect to
which the insider owes the corporation a duty of loyalty. . . ."5 While
Diamond had suggested that insider trading might in fact cause actual
harm to a corporation's public reputation," the Seventh Circuit minimized
the significance of such a possibility and emphasized that the existence of
any injury to a corporation's reputation for integrity must be considered
speculative absent evidence that such injury occurs. 6 The Freeman court
also questioned whether it was proper to conclude that an insider who
trades on the basis of inside information is unjustly enriched at the corpo-
ration's expense given that the corporation could not have used the infor-
mation for its own economic benefit.57 While a corporate officer or director
will be required to account to the corporation for usurping a corporate
opportunity," the Seventh Circuit concluded that such an element of loss
was absent from a Diamond-type situation, 5 and thus there was no harm
to the corporation which would justify a Diamond cause of action.
The Seventh Circuit also addressed the analytical possibility that a
defendant held liable to the corporation under a common law theory of
fiduciary responsibility ultimately may be subjected to double liability if
subsequently found to be liable under federal law." The Diamond court,
while acknowledging that defendants who trade on the basis of inside
information often violate federal law," concluded that the existent federal
remedies were limited so as effectively to preclude the possibility of double
recovery.2 The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that an SEC initiated
10b-5 action only would be brought to provide injunctive relief in excep-
tional circumstances. 3 While a private 10b-5 action is conceivable, the
anonymous nature of stock exchange transactions arguably presents insur-
mountable obstacles to any purchaser-instituted actions. 4 The Diamond
11 Id. at 193. In conformity with the corporate opportunity doctrine, see note 32 supra,
the Freeman court suggested that inside information should be considered as a corporate asset
only where "the corporation was in a position to potentially avail itself of the opportunity"
to exploit the inside information for a corporate benefit. Id.
24 N.Y.2d at 497-99, 248 N.E.2d at 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82; see note 36 supra.
" 584 F.2d at 194. The Freeman court questioned whether an injury to a corporation's
public reputation, if existent, would form an adequate basis for an action founded on a breach
of a fiduciary duty. Id. The court indicated that an action for damages based on a breach of
the general duty of care might be a more appropriate remedy if harm to the corporate goodwill
actually occurs. Id.
11 Id. at 193. The Seventh Circuit correctly discerned that a corporation which attempted
to exploit nonpublic inside information by dealing in its own securities would become poten-
tially liable under federal and state securities laws. Id. at 194.
6 See note 31 supra.
" 584 F.2d at 194.
o Id. at 195. The fear of dual liability was raised by the defendants in Diamond and
Schein, and was addressed by the Seventh Circuit in Freeman. See text accompanying notes
58-65 infra.
S1 24 N.Y.2d at 502, 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
12 Id. at 501-503, 248 N.E.2d at 914-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85.
" Id.; see, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
Trading in shares on national stock exchanges involves highly impersonal, generally
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court thus concluded that the recognition of a common law cause of action
in favor of a corporation, providing for corporate recovery of insider trading
profits, in all likelihood would not expose defendants to potential double
liability."5
The Freeman court questioned the reasoning of the New York Court of
Appeals and expressed concern over the potential imposition of double
liability.6 The concern over double liability is unfounded, however, if the
Diamond cause of action is accepted since the use of inside information will
result in the occurrence of two distinct legal wrongs. An insider who uses
non-public material information by dealing in the corporate stock will
breach fiduciary duties owed to the corporation as well as violate federal
securities laws. 7 Two causes of action will arise based on separate and
distinct sources of liability. The resulting dual recovery, under both state
and federal law, arguably will further the control of insider trading by
providing an increased deterrent.68
While acknowledging that the imposition of double liability may be
analytically justifiable since two causes of action may be involved, the
Seventh Circuit questioned whether the derivative cause of action created
by Diamond could remain viable if the investors who are the direct victims
of insider trading were able to bring a private 10b-5 class action suit. A
primary justification for the creation of the Didmond cause of action was
anonymous transactions, and often may involve the transfer of uncertificated shares. The
anonymous nature of the exchange makes tracing of the actual purchaser or seller who deals
with a corporate insider virtually impossible. Such tracing difficulties greatly limit, if not
preclude, the chances of bringing a successful private 10b-5 action to recover insider trading
profits. 24 N.Y.2d at 503, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 85. Similarly, the mechanical
difficulties of bringing federal class action suits arguably would preclude any threat of double
recovery under class actions. See note 22 supra.
24 N.Y.2d at 504, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
" The Diamond court had argued that even if double liability were a reasonable possibil-
ity, the mere possibility should not deter the formulation of a common law remedy insofar
as a defendant faced with the unhappy prospect of potential double liability could interplead
all possible claimants thus binding them to the judgment. Id. at 503, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 85. See FED. R. Civ. P. 22. The Freeman court questioned the efficiacy of resort
to an interpleader action since state courts arguably would lack jurisdiction over the inter-
pleaded 10b-5 claimants. 584 F.2d at 195. See 55 VA. L. REv. 1520, 1531 n.51 (1969). The
jurisdictional criticism of the Diamond court's suggested use of an interpleader is valid.
Resort to an interpleader action becomes unnecessary, however, if separate and distinct cause
of action are found to exist. See text accompanying notes 66-71 infra.
" See Note, From Brophy To Diamond To Schein: Muddled Thinking, Excellent Result,
1 J. CORP. L. 83, 95-98 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Muddled'Thinking]. Note, Common Law
Corporate Recovery For Trading on Non-Public Information, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 289-9i
(1974). Arguably, the fact that the measure of damages under both corporate recovery and
purchaser-shareholder recovery would be equal creates the misplaced concern that double
recovery is possible. Muddled Thinking, supra at 97-98. Given that two distinct causes of
action exist, the similarity in damage computation does not create duplicate liability. Id. at
98.
'5 Muddled Thinking, supra note 67, at 97-98.
'5 584 F.2d at 195.
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the perceived inadequacy of the existing federal laws. 0 The Freeman court
thus viewed the corporation in a Diamond-type derivative suit as a
"surrogate plaintiff"', the need for which would disappear if federal provi-
sions were enforceable through private 10b-5 actions.7"
The Seventh Circuit argued that the private 10b-5 class action has
made substantial advances toward becoming the kind of effective remedy
for insider trading that the New York Court of Appeals had hoped that it
would become, and thereby has removed the justification for a common
law cause of action.7 2 There is, however, very little support for the Seventh
Circuit's view of the present efficacy of private 10b-5 actions. The Seventh
Circuit based its claim that private federal remedies may now be a more
effective deterent to insider trading on Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc.
7
1
In Shapiro, the Second Circuit upheld private 10b-5 recovery of dam-
ages by market investors who dealt only through the national stock ex-
changes and who did not claim to have purchased or sold directly from the
defendant insiders. 7 Shapiro was decided, however, prior to the Supreme
Court's explicit reaffirmation in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
75
of the purchaser-seller requirement, and other jurisdictions have not read-
ily followed the Shapiro decision in allowing recovery under an expanded
view of the purchaser-seller requirement.7 6 Additionally, the Shapiro ra-
tionale was rejected in Fridrich v. Bradford 7 wherein the Sixth Circuit
70 See text accompanying notes 4-22 supra.
71 584 F.2d at 195.
72 Id.
13 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). The Freeman
court cited three cases in support of the contention that private damage recovery has been
allowed on behalf of investors who transacted through impersonal stock exchanges. Two of
the cases, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1005 (1971), and SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974) did not involve private actions.
Only Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. involved a private action. 353
F. Supp. at 268.
1, The plaintiffs in Shapiro purchased shares of Douglas Aircraft Company common
stock during a four day period in which the defendants either sold from existing positions or
effected short sales of more than 165,000 shares. 353 F. Supp. at 269. The defendants' transac-
tions were made with knowledge of, and prior to public disclosure of, significantly reduced
corporate earnings. Id.
421 U.S. 723 (1975); see note 11 supra.
" The Shapiro rationale has been accepted by the United States District Court for the
central district of California. See In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litigation, 416
F. Supp. 161, 185 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The Equity Funding court rejected the notion that the
purchaser-seller requirement mandates the actual purchase or sale of stock from the defen-
dants. Rather, in conformity with Shapiro, the district court held that a 10b-5 action need
not involve direct privity where massive trading without disclosure of material inside infor-
mation is alleged. 416 F. Supp. at 185.
7 542 F.2d 307, 319 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). The Sixth Circuit
refused to extend private 10b-5 actions "to impersonal market cases where plaintiffs have
neither dealt with defendants nor been influenced in their trading decisions by any act of the
defendants." 542 F.2d at 321.
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criticized Shapiro as assuming the very injury which is then declared com-
pensable. 8 Further doubt may be cast upon Shapiro's continued validity
by the stringent, if not perclusive, requirements for bringing federal class
action suits. Thus, despite the Seventh Circuit's contentions, the federal
securities laws have not been expanded sufficiently to allow market inves-
tors to remedy abuses of inside information. The purchaser-seller require-
ment continues to pose practical difficulties with regard to establishing
standing to sue in private 10b-5 actions, 8° and the analytical justification
for the Diamond decision remains valid.
The Diamond cause of action serves to regulate insider trading by pro-
viding a remedy for the unregulated exploitation of inside information. The
validity of the Diamond remedy is dependent on the validity of the premise
that inside information is the equivalent of a corporate asset to which
fiduciary responsibility is owed. Such categorization of inside information
creates a valuable legal fiction. As with any legal fiction, however, applica-
tion of the corporate asset theory to inside information cannot be justified
by readily perceived or manifest legal principles, but rather must be justi-
fied through empirical analysis.
The Seventh Circuit suggests that inside information only should be
considered as a corporate asset if there is potential loss to the corporation
through the use of such information in insider trading.8' The Seventh Cir-
cuit's position is nothing more than a restatement of the common law
corporate opportunity doctrine," and fails to acknowledge the value of the
public policy justifications of the Diamond decision. 3 By providing for a
common law derivative right to recover insider trading profits, the New
York Court of Appeals sought not merely to fill an accurately perceived
inadequacy in the federal securities laws, but also sought to insure equality
of access to information in the securities marketplace.The policy objective
of providing investors with fair and equal access to market information 4
justifies deterrence of insider trading, whether implemented through fed-
eral or state law." Federal law, although a powerful regulating force,
should not be considered preemptive of state law in the field of securities
regulation.8 As the Diamond court discerned, there is nothing in the fed-
eral law which indicates that states may not fashion additional remedies
78 Id. at 318. The Sixth Circuit emphasized that a causal connection must be established
between the defendant's misconduct and the plaintiff's loss. Id.
71 See note 21 supra. See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976).
, 584 F.2d at 193.
s2 See note 32 supra.
83 See text accompanying notes 84-85 infra.
11 See note 50 supra.
" Section 28(a) of the '34 Act states that "[t]he rights and remedies provided by this
chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or
in equity." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1976).
" See id.
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to effectuate purposes similar to those which justify the federal scheme. 7
Implementation of the Diamond cause of action deters insider trading and
thereby effectuates purposes similar to those which justify Rule 10b and
section 16(b) of the '34 Act.M
The Diamond cause of action, however, has the potential to be a far
greater impediment to the misuse of nonpublic material information. The
scope of the Diamond decision may be extended in two ways. First,
Diamond may be extended to cover third party defendants who actively
cause or assist an insider to violate a fiduciary duty." Second, Diamond
may be extended to impose liability on any third party who receives non-
public material information with the knowledge that the disclosure of such
information violates a fiduciary duty. If the objective of deterring the
improper use of inside information and providing equality of access to
market information is to be given full effect, the second alternative should
be adopted.' To allow third party extra-corporate defendants to retain
profits gained by virtue of an insider's breach of a fiduciary duty essen-
tially would permit an insider to avoid liability merely by providing an
outsider with the material information upon which to trade. 2 The
Diamond decision represents a positive step toward filling the continuing
void in remedial alternatives for recovery of insider trading profits. Recog-
nition and extension of the Diamond cause of action will help eliminate
the abuse of inside information and will further the legitimate policy objec-
tive of deterring insider trading.
JAMES P. OsIcK
24 N.Y.2d at 503, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
' See text accompanying notes 4-22 supra.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1958).
,0 See id. § 312, Comment c (1958).
" See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (tipees found to be
insiders within purview of 10b-5).
"2 The Second Circuit correctly discerned that it would be self-defeating to limit the
reach of Diamond to directors and officers while allowing third party co-venturers to escape
liability. 478 F.2d at 822-23.
[Vol. XXXVI
